Inequality, coalitions and collective action

Pranab K. Bardhan, Nirvikar Singh

In a model where cooperation is beneficial, but subject to cheating, and is supported by trigger strategy punishments in a repeated game, we explore the relationship between the nature of cooperation (size and composition of coalitions) and underlying inequality in the distribution of private productive assets.

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Year of publication:	May 2004
Authors:	Bardhan, Pranab K. ; Singh, Nirvikar
Publisher:	[Santa Cruz, CA] : [University of California Santa Cruz, Economics Department]
Subject:	inequality \| self-enforcing \| collective action \| infrastructure \| Kooperatives Spiel \| Cooperative game \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Koalition \| Coalition \| Theorie \| Theory \| Wiederholte Spiele \| Repeated games

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 33 Seiten)
Series:	Working papers / UC Santa Cruz Economics Department. - Santa Cruz, Calif. : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2222459-2. - Vol. [570]
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/83847 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D30 - Distribution. General ; D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General ; O10 - Economic Development. General ; P0 - Economic Systems. General
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011520520