We present and analyze a theory of cooperative bargaining under asymmetric information, based on the equity principles of the conditional random dictatorship—choosing with equal probability one of the individuals to act as a dictator under the participation constraint of the other players. Our...

This paper advances the idea that, in a variety of environments, it is natural to think of the solution of a (coalition form) game as an ordering of the players rather than as a division of the value of coalitions. Orderings that are characterized by an average of the desirability of one player...

In this paper we consider the problem of the control of access to a firm's productive asset, embedding the relevant decisionmakers into a general structure of formal authority relations. Within such an authority structure, each decision maker acts as a principal to some decision makers, while...

Communication has been regarded as one of the most effective devices in promoting team cooperation. But asymmetric communication sometimes breeds collusion and is detrimental to team efficiency. Here, we present experimental evidence showing that excluding one member from team communication...

This paper considers one-machine sequencing situations in which agents are in a fixed initial order before the processing of the machine starts. The agents are allowed to rearrange positions to save costs w.r.t. the costs given by the initial order. We will assume that the agents are not certain...

We experimentally examine how the incentive to defect in a social dilemma affects conditional cooperation. In our first study we conduct online experiments in which subjects play eight Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma games with payoffs systematically varied across games. We find that few second...