In an experiment, a group of strangers was randomly divided in pairs to play a prisoners' dilemma; this process was indefinitely repeated. Cooperation did not increase when subjects could send public messages amounting to binding promises of future play

We study the emergence of norms of cooperation in experimental economies populated by strangers interacting indefinitely and lacking formal enforcement institutions. In all treatments the efficient outcome is sustainable as an equilibrium. We address the following questions: can these economies...

This book uses game theory to analyze the strategies developed in negotiation processes. Offering a detailed analysis of competition and cooperation, it explores various bargaining strategies that result from the application of Nash equilibrium and mixed strategies. Employing a blend of game...

We study a setting where players are matched into pairs to play a Prisoners' Dilemma game. In the model presented, players are not rational; they simply imitate the more successful actions they observe. Furthermore, a certain correlation is added to the matching process: players that belong to a...