We investigate patterns of abnormal stock performance around insider trades and option exercises on the Dutch market. Listed firms in the Netherlands have a long tradition of employing many anti-shareholder mechanisms limiting shareholders rights. Our results imply that insider transactions are...

We investigate patterns of abnormal stock performance around insider trades on the Dutch market. Listed firms in the Netherlands have a long tradition of limiting shareholders rights. Using a change in corporate governance regulations as a natural experiment we show that governance rules have a...

We investigate patterns of abnormal stock performance around insider trades on the Dutch market. Listed firms in the Netherlands have a long tradition of limiting shareholders rights. Using a change in corporate governance regulations as a natural experiment we show that governance rules have a...

We examine how CEO compensation is affected by the presence of busy and overlap directors. We find that CEOs at firms with more busy directors receive greater total pay, fixed-salary and equity-linked pay and exhibit higher pay-performance (delta) and pay-risk (vega) sensitivities. Our results...

Using a large sample of U.S. firms for the period 1993-2009, we provide evidence that the sensitivity of a chief financial officer's (CFO) option portfolio value to stock price is significantly and positively related to the firm's future stock price crash risk. In contrast, we find only weak...

We investigate the performance and its link with information asymmetry, corporate governance and legal enforcement of insider transactions in 36 countries covering 10 Asian countries, 20 European countries and 6 countries in the rest. The results show that abnormal returns after insider trading...

Theories of corporate boards assume that board members of a firm generate private information about the quality and performance of its CEO in the process of monitoring and advising him, and may use this information to decide whether or not to fire him. In this paper, I make use of data on...

Using a novel dataset containing U.S. companies’ regular board meeting schedules, we find evidence of informed trading by outside directors prior to board meetings. In the days prior to board meetings, when outside directors possess private information, they make purchases that yield higher...

We examine the effectiveness of corporate governance in monitoring private in-house meetings between management and investors. Consistent with better corporate governance curbing the opportunistic corporate disclosure and insider trading behavior, we find a negative association between...

This study investigates the endogenous relationship between abnormal insider trading and accrual abuse, and explores whether corporate governance affects this relationship. Our results suggest that insiders take advantage of private information on abnormal accruals to time their trading and...