The most influential theory of corporate governance, principal agency theory, does not take into consideration that the key task of modern corporations is to generate and transfer firm-specific knowledge. It proposes that, in order to overcome the widespread corporate scandals, the interests of...

The discussion about employee representation on supervisory boards has received much attention from scholars and politicians around the world. We provide new insights to this ongoing debate by employing power indices from game theory to examine the "real" power of employees on boards and its...

The aim of this paper is to examine whether or not the structure of the board of directors and, in particular, board size, independence and remuneration have an impact on firm performance. The sample examined is UK FTSE 100 non-financial companies using data from the period 2012 to 2015. A...

We analyze the relationship between board-level codetermination and shareholder value. We use a unique dataset of listed German companies that enables us to identify heterogeneous aspects of codetermination and overcome otherwise common identification issues. We find that codetermination reduces...

We analyze the effects of supervisory board size and composition on the valuation and performance of all German firms listed in the DAX, MDAX and SDAX over the period 1998-2007 (n=294 companies with 2,382 firm-year-observations). Controlling for a large number of other (potential) determinants...

This paper focuses on the links between labor market institutions and offshoring, with specific reference to the role of codetermination in shaping the international operations of German firms. We use case studies to illustrate how works councils deal with three important aspects of offshoring...

This paper examines the determinants of executive turnover on two-tiered boards, emphasizing the monitoring role of supervisory board members with simultaneous outside directorships. Based on a unique sample of executives from large German firms, we find that outside supervisory board members...

The debate on employee representation on corporate boards has received considerable attention from scholars and politicians around the world. We provide new insights to this ongoing discussion by applying power indices from game theory to examine the actual voting power of employees on boards...

This paper reconsiders the orthodox Anglo-American understanding of labour as a constituency situated outside of the core corporate governance domain. It challenges the dominant neo-classical theory of the firm, which asserts that shareholders are in general the only group of ‘incomplete’...