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Why EMU is not a failure
Grüner, Hans Peter - In: European journal of political economy 26 (2010) 1, pp. 1-11
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003940116
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Monetary target announcements, reputation and hysteresis : paper presented at the EEA Ninth Annual Congress 1994, Maastricht
Grüner, Hans Peter - 1994
Two signaling games of monetary policy are considered: game one examines the effect of hysteresis on the labor market on the results of the repeated monetary policy game. Disciplinary effects of reputation disappear in presence of hysteresis. The second game compares weifare effects of monetary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009774705
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Monetary target announcements, reputation and hysteresis
Grüner, Hans Peter - 1994
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013388107
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Monetary target announcements, reputation and hysteresis
Grüner, Hans Peter - 1994
Two signaling games of monetary policy are considered: game one examines the effect of hysteresis on the labor market on the results of the repeated monetary policy game. Disciplinary effects of reputation disappear in presence of hysteresis. The second game compares weifare effects of monetary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010397973
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Monetary policy in a signaling-game with a two dimensional type-space
Grüner, Hans Peter - 1993 - Version: 28.08.1993
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000879528
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Monetary policy, reputation and hysteresis
Grüner, Hans Peter - In: Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften … 116 (1996) 1, pp. 15-29
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001201318
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Zentralbankglaubwürdigkeit und Insider-Macht : empirische Evidenz
Grüner, Hans Peter - In: Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik (1995), pp. 385-400
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001182234
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Monetary target announcements, reputation and hysteresis
Grüner, Hans Peter - Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Universität Konstanz - 1994
Two signaling games of monetary policy are considered: game one examines the effect of hysteresis on the labor market on the results of the repeated monetary policy game. Disciplinary effects of reputation disappear in presence of hysteresis. The second game compares weifare effects of monetary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010986312
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Should central banks really be flexible?
Grüner, Hans Peter - 2002
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013434514