This paper is a case study that focuses on possible incentive problems in the management of Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs). CLOs are the most important type of special purpose vehicles in the leveraged loan market, and their managers appear to have a considerable impact on performance....

We address the moral hazard problem of securitization using a principal-agent model where the investor is the principal and the lender is the agent. Our model considers structured asset-backed securitization with a credit enhancement (tranching) procedure. We assume that the originator can...

Using all loans granted to firms recorded in the Italian credit register, we estimate correlations between risk-transfer and default probabilities to gauge the severity of informational asymmetries in the loan securitization market. First, the analysis confirms the presence of information...

This study examines the relationship between securitization and loan performance using proprietary loan-level data from a Chinese bank. Securitized loans exhibit lower ex-post default rates and prepayment chances compared to the loans retained on the bank's balance sheet, suggesting no adverse...

How does renegotiation affect contracts between a principal and an agent subject to persistent private information and moral hazard? This paper introduces a concept of renegotiation-proofness, which adapts to stochastic games the concepts of weak renegotiation-proofness and internal consistency...

Can central counterparty (CCP) clearing control counterparty risk in the presence of risk taking that can aggravate such risk? When counterparty risk is not observable, I show that central clearing leads to higher collateral requirements for two different reasons. Without collusion about risk...

How does renegotiation affect contracts between a principal and an agent subject to persistent private information and moral hazard? This paper introduces a concept of renegotiationproofness, which adapts to stochastic games the concepts of weak renegotiation-proofness and internal consistency...

Derivatives activity, motivated by risk-sharing, can breed risk-taking. Bad news about the risk of the asset underlying the derivative increases the expected liability of a protection seller and undermines her risk-prevention incentives. This limits risk-sharing, and may create endogenous...

I examine a simple model of dynamic moral hazard in which the agent has persistent private information. I show that despite the complexity of the framework, the problem has a simple solution that can be found using standard methods. The incentives at the optimal contract can be captured using...

This paper is a case study that focuses on possible incentive problems in the management of Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs). CLOs are the most important type of special purpose vehicles in the leveraged loan market, and their managers appear to have a considerable impact on performance....