A learning rule is uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's payoffs. It is radically uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's actions or payoffs. We demonstrate a family of simple, radically uncoupled learning rules whose...

Predictions under common knowledge of payoffs may differ from those under arbitrarily, but finitely, many orders of mutual knowledge; Rubinstein's (1989)Email game is a seminal example. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) showed that the discontinuity in the example generalizes: for all types with...

This note investigates a set of dynamic versions of the level-k (LK) and cognitive hierarchy (CH) models in repeated normal-form games. Conventional LK and CH models assume a reasoning process that does not allow learning. This can be a restrictive assumption: When facing a repeated game,...

The ultimatum game is a sequential-move bargaining game in which a “giver” offers a “taker” a share of a monetary pie. The predicted subgame perfect equilibrium is for rational givers to offer the smallest possible share, and for rational takers to accept. Experimental trials conducted...

This paper builds on one of the results of Pruzhansky [22], namely that maximin strategies guarantee the same expected payoffs as mixed Nash equilibrium strategies in bimatrix games. We present a discussion on the applicability of maximin strategies in such class of games. The usefulness of...

The traditional model of sequential decision making, for instance, in extensive form games, is a tree. Most texts de?ne a tree as a connected directed graph without loops and a distinguished node, called the root. But an abstract graph is not a domain for decision theory. Decision theory...

The standard framework for analyzing games with incomplete information models players as if they form beliefs about their opponents' beliefs about their opponents' beliefs and so on, that is, as if players have an infinite depth of reasoning. This strong assumption has nontrivial implications,...

I study how choice behavior given unawareness of an event differs from choice behavior given subjective belief of zero probability on that event. Depending on different types of unawareness the decision-maker suffers, behavior under unawareness is either incomparable with that under zero...

By its critics, the rational choice model is routinely accused of being unrealistic. One key objection has it that, for all nontrivial problems, calculating the best response is cognitively way too taxing, given the severe cognitive limitations of the human mind. If one confines the analysis to...

I investigate the existence of epistemic models for complete information games that satisfy the following properties: (R) players do not rule out their opponents use rational ex ante strategies for deriving their choices, (K) they do not rule out, ex ante, that they can come to know the action...