Fiscal rules have become popular to limit deficits and high debt burdens in industrialized countries. A growing literature examines their impact based on aggregate fiscal performance. So far, no evidence exists on how fiscal rules influence deficit expectations of fiscal policy makers. In the...

The present paper analyzes expectations of German politicians about the German debt brake (Schuldenbremse), which became part of the German constitution in 2009. This fiscal rule requires the federal government and the German states to run a (cyclically adjusted) budget deficit of no more than...

In many federal countries, local governments run large deficits, even when fiscal supervision by state authorities is tight. I investigate to which extent party alignment of governments and fiscal supervisors influences budget deficits. The dataset includes 427 German local governments for the...

Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist für viele Entwicklungsländer ein wichtiges Gläubigerland. In der Gruppe der "Highly Indebted Poor Countries" (HIPCs), einer von Weltbank und IWF klassifizierten Gruppe von 40 hoch verschuldeten und besonders armen Ländern, gehört die deutsche...

States have soft budget constraints when they can expect a bailout by the federal government in the event of a financial crisis. This gives rise to incentives for unsound state fiscal policy. We test whether states with softer budget constraints have higher debt and deficits, receive more...

States have soft budget constraints when they can expect a bailout by the federal government in the event of a financial crisis. This gives rise to incentives for unsound state fiscal policy. We test whether states with softer budget constraints have higher debt and deficits, receive more...

States have soft budget constraints when they can expect a bailout by the federal government in the event of a financial crisis. This gives rise to incentives for unsound state fiscal policy. We test whether states with softer budget constraints have higher debts and deficits, receive more...