With the rise of strategic outsourcing, the distribution of skills and competences between partners grows increasingly uneven. This misalignment reflects the complex distribution of responsibilities under outsourcing arrangements. Because each firm in an outsourcing arrangement may have to...

Flexibility in response to competitive pressure from globalized markets and increasingly individualized customer desires has become vital for firms. A common strategy to address this challenge is to employ a dynamic concept of organization and reach beyond the boundaries of the firm....

Flexibility in response to competitive pressure from globalized markets and increasingly individualized customer desires has become vital for firms. A common strategy to address this challenge is to employ a dynamic concept of organization and reach beyond the boundaries of the firm....

We empirically address value appropriation hazards when firms enter into external relationships in search for innovation. Using firm-level data from Germany we document a positive link between R&D outsourcing and IP infringement. In line with theory we show that this effect varies with the...

In diesem Beitrag werden theoretische Erklärungen gesucht für die dauerhaft hohe Abweichungsquote der Entsprechenserklärungen hinsichtlich Vorstandsabfindungen von über 20 % von Empfehlung Ziffer 4.2.3 Abs. 4 Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex und für die Unabhängigkeit der...

Empfehlungen zur Beschränkung von Abfindungen an vorzeitig ausscheidende Vorstandsmitglieder werden häufig nicht eingehalten. Solange Vorstandsmitglieder nicht gegen ihren Willen entlassen werden dürfen, ist eine Beschränkung der Abfindungen weder im Interesse der Unternehmen noch effizient....

In diesem Beitrag werden theoretische Erklärungen gesucht für die dauerhaft hohe Abweichungsquote der Entsprechenserklärungen hinsichtlich Vorstandsabfindungen von über 20 % von Empfehlung Ziffer 4.2.3 Abs. 4 Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex und für die Unabhängigkeit der...

We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...

We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...

We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...