This paper focuses on gender differences in the role played by locus of control within a model that predicts outcomes for men and women at two opposite poles of the labour market: high level managerial / leadership positions and unemployment. Based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel,...

Nach wie vor sind die Vorstandsposten der größten 200 Unternehmen Deutschlands nahezu ausschließlich mit Männern besetzt. Frauen nahmen 2010 nur 3,2 Prozent der Vorstandssitze ein. Diesen geringen Anteilswert unterschreiten die größten 100 Unternehmen und die DAX30-Unternehmen mit 2,2...

Bisherige Studien zur Leiharbeit haben sich primär mit den Arbeitsbedingungen sowie den strategischen Einsatzgründen der Leiharbeit befasst. In diesem Beitrag wird versucht, erste Erkenntnisse zum Leistungsverhalten von Leiharbeitnehmern zu erhalten. Der Arbeitsmarkt für Profifußballer...

There are some peculiarities for applying as a doctoral student in Germany. The aim of this paper is to explain the most important ones for foreign graduates considering doctoral studies in Germany. Doctoral studies are free in Germany and one can get even a paid job at the university or a...

This contribution investigates severance payments for dismissed employees in Germany. Subsequent to an overview about the legal framework, we respond to the following questions: Who receives severance payments? By which characteristics is the level of severance payments determined? Is...

This contribution investigates severance payments for dismissed employees in Germany. Particularly, it responds to the following questions: Who receives severance payments? By which characteristics is the level of severance payments determined? Is overcompensation to be considered a relevant...

Since the early 90's the West German firms have to deal with sharp changes of economic environment: the German Unification, the emerging competitors in the east European countries and the deregulation of several labour market institutions. We analyse the wage structure, the wage changes and the...

We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...