In this paper we apply standard cartel theory to identify the major institutional stabilizers of Germany?s area tariff system of collective bargaining between a single industry union and the industry?s employers association. Our cartel analysis allows us to demonstrate that recent labor policy...

This paper offers a cartel explanation for the stability of German collective bargaining institutions.We show that a dense net of legal safeguards has been yarned around the wage setting cartel. These measures make deviation by cartel insiders less attractive and simultaneously erect entry...

We analyze the bargaining problem of an incumbent firm and a union when the wage contract becomes generally binding. Our main application relates to competition among operators of mail delivery networks. We describe the Deutsche Post case which highlights the raising rivals' costs incentive and...

Das Instrument der Allgemeinverbindlicherklärung von Tarifverträgen spielt in Deutschland anders als in anderen europäischen Ländern nur eine sehr begrenzte Rolle. In den vergangenen beiden Jahrzehnten ist insbesondere die Zahl der allgemeinverbindlichen Lohntarifverträge stark...

Das Instrument der Allgemeinverbindlicherklärung von Tarifverträgen spielt in Deutschland anders als in anderen europäischen Ländern nur eine sehr begrenzte Rolle. In den vergangenen beiden Jahrzehnten ist insbesondere die Zahl der allgemeinverbindlichen Lohntarifverträge stark...

This study provides the first econometric analysis on the dynamic dimension of establishment-level codetermination in Germany. We hypothesize that learning implies a change in the nature and scope of codetermination over time. Using unique data from small- and medium-sized establishments, our...

We analyze the bargaining problem of an incumbent firm and a union when the wage contract becomes generally binding. Our main application relates to competition among operators of mail delivery networks. We describe the Deutsche Post case which highlights the raising rivals' costs incentive and...

We analyze the bargaining problem of an incumbent firm and a union when the wage contract becomes generally binding. Our main application relates to competition among operators of mail delivery networks. We describe the Deutsche Post case which highlights the raising rivals' costs incentive and...

This paper offers a cartel explanation for the stability of German collective bargaining institutions.We show that a dense net of legal safeguards has been yarned around the wage setting cartel. These measures make deviation by cartel insiders less attractive and simultaneously erect entry...