The literature on the economics of fiscal decentralization stresses the potential for both positive and negative effects on the quality of governance in a country. The empirical evidence on the issue is scant. In this paper, we add to the empirical evidence by testing for a relationship between...

The literature on the economics of fiscal decentralization stresses the potential for both positive and negative effects on the quality of governance in a country. The empirical evidence on the issue is scant. In this paper, we add to the empirical evidence by testing for a relationship between...

Formal and informal institutions are often viewed as complements or substitutes in empirical and theoretical works. However, no evidence of complementarities or substitutes is found in our empirical analysis of the interrelation between formal and informal decentralization across 64 provinces of...

In this study we explore in detail the causes of corruption in China using two different sets of data at the regional level (provinces and cities). We observe that regions with more anti-corruption efforts, histories of British rule, higher openness, more access to media and relatively higher...

Formal and informal institutions are often viewed as complements or substitutes in empirical and theoretical works. However, no evidence of complementarities or substitutes is found in our empirical analysis of the interrelation between formal and informal decentralization across 64 provinces of...

In prior studies, accounting and decentralization corruption solutions have so far been analysed in isolation. In this article, we connect these two strands of literature on corruption. Understanding this connection is important because weak financial accounting and reporting systems can inhibit...

We analyze the determinants of the excessive administrative spending of local governments in Indonesia. In an unbalanced panel data set of 399 districts for 2001‐2009, we show that the proliferation of districts has not led to increased administrative spending; instead a lack of political...

Oates' decentralization theorem (Oates [20]) grounds on the assumption that the central government is incapable to discriminate public policy on a regional basis. This assumption has sometimes been justified by some informational advantage of local governments about the social and economic...

Formal and informal institutions are often viewed as complements or substitutes in empirical and theoretical works. However, no evidence of complementarities or substitutes is found in our empirical analysis of the interrelation between formal and informal decentralization across 64 provinces of...