We show that, if giving is equivalent to not taking, impure altruism could account for List’s (in Journal of Political Economy 115(3):482–493, <CitationRef CitationID="CR16">2007</CitationRef>) finding that the payoff to recipients in a dictator game decreases when the dictator has the option to take. We examine behavior in dictator...</citationref>

We design an experiment to test whether incomplete crowding out in dictator games can be rationalized by the impurely altruistic preferences. By giving the recipients an endowment of varying levels, we create an environment in which crowding out may occur. We find that the behavior of 66% of the...

We present the results of an experiment designed to identify more clearly the motivation underlying dictators’ behavior. In the typical dictator game, recipients are given no endowment. We give an endowment to the recipient as well as the dictator. This new dimension allows us to test directly...