We study an insurance model characterized by a continuum of risk types, private information and a competitive supply … side. We use the model to investigate the welfare effects of discrimination (also known as risk selection). We postulate … find that aggregate surplus decreases when risk aversion is high. When risk aversion is low however, discrimination …

a disease (a discrimination risk). Differently, Consent Law allows them to hide this detrimental information, creating …

discrimination risk. CL allows agents to withhold that information, generating adverse selection. We complement our model with an …

discrimination risk. CL allows agents to withhold that information, generating adverse selection. We complement our model with an …

a disease (a discrimination risk). Differently, Consent Law allows them to hide this detrimental information, creating …

discrimination risk. CL allows agents to withhold that information, generating adverse selection. We complement our model with an …

This paper offers a new theory of discrimination in the workplace. We consider a manager who has to assign two tasks to … employees expect to be favored. The manager, who has no taste for discrimination, discriminates in order to avoid demotivating …

explanation for this pattern, namely preference- and belief-free discrimination. In our setting, an employer can increase effort … discrimination between workers optimal. …