-shot competitive interactions, like Bertrand oligopolies and first-price auctions, where no collusion would be supportable otherwise … reduce or at best cancel sanctions for price-fixing firms that self-report -- may make collusion enforceable even in one …

-shot competitive interactions, like Bertrand oligopolies and first-price auctions, where no collusion would be supportable otherwise … or at best cancel sanctions for price-fixing firms that self-report -- may make collusion enforceable even in one …

the link between overt collusion and price dispersion. Formal theories and observation of cartel behavior suggest that …

We investigate the effect of a ban on third-degree price discrimination on the sustainability of collusion. We build a …' discount factor has to be higher in order to sustain collusion in grim-trigger strategies under price discrimination than under …

switch from exporting to undertaking FDI when trade costs are relatively high. Also, collusion over FDI may increase welfare. …

merger is accepted with an attendant risk of collusion with the benchmark case in which competition is present ex-post. The … collude if a merger is rejected. In fact, firms can have incitations to make collusion ex-post (after a rejection of a merger …) whereas they would not make collusion ex-ante. All the papers on mergers and collusion tend to look at a minimal discount …