It has been shown in prior research that cost effectiveness in the competitive emissions permit market could be affected by tacit collusion or price manipulation when the corresponding polluting product market is oligopolistic. We analyze these cross market links using a Stackelberg model to...

A finite number of sellers (n) compete in schedules to supply an elastic demand. The costs of the sellers have uncertain common and private value components and there is no exogenous noise in the system. A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized; the equilibrium is privately...

We study bargained input prices where up and downstream firms can choose alternative vertical partners. We apply our model to bargained airport landing fees where a number of interesting policy questions have arisen. For example, what is the impact of joint ownership of airports? Does airline...

In the text-book model of dynamic Bertrand competition, competing firms meet the same demand function every period. This is not a satisfactory model of the demand side if consumers can make intertemporal substitution between periods. Each period then leaves some residual demand to future...

In the text-book model of dynamic Bertrand competition, competing firms meet the same demand function every period. This is not a satisfactory model of the demand side if consumers can make intertemporal substitution between periods. Each period then leaves some residual demand to future...

We model capacity-building investments in a homogeneous product duopoly facing uncertain demand growth. Capacity building is achieved through the addition of production units that are durable and lumpy and whose cost is irreversible. While building their capacity over time, firms compete à la...

This paper studies competition in data-driven markets, that is, markets where the cost of quality production is decreasing in the amount of machine-generated data about user preferences or characteristics, which is an inseparable byproduct of using services offered in such markets. This gives...

We analyze imperfect competition in dynamic environments where firms use rivalrous but non-excludable industry-specific capital that is provided exogenously. Capital depreciation depends on utilization, so firms influence the evolution of the capital equipment through more or less intensive...

We analyze imperfect competition in dynamic environments where firms use rivalrous but nonexcludable industry-specific capital that is provided exogenously. Capital depreciation depends on utilization, so firms influence the evolution of the capital equipment through more or less intensive...