Lack of transmission capacity hampers the efficient integration of the European electricity market, and thereby precludes reaping the full benefits of competition. We investigate to what extent the expansion of the transmission grid promotes competition, efficiency, and welfare. This work...

We examine incentives of bottleneck facility holders to manipulate access charge accounting in free entry downstream markets. We consider the situation wherein one firm holds an upstream bottleneck facility and new entrants use it at the regulated price (access fee) to provide final products....

Increasingly popular tailored regulation (TR) initiatives like EPA's Project XL allow plants to voluntarily substitute site-specific environmental performance standards for command-and-control regulations that dictate pollution abatement strategies. TR can significantly reduce participants'...

We examine incentives of bottleneck facility holders to manipulate access charge accounting in free entry downstream markets. We consider the situation wherein one firm holds an upstream bottleneck facility and new entrants use it at the regulated price (access fee) to provide final products....

This paper studies the effect of a minimum quality standard, a compulsory labeling scheme, and the combination of both instruments in a vertical differentiation model when not all quality dimensions of products can be observed byconsumers. Both a minimum quality standard on the non-observable...

We modify the vertically differentiated duopoly model by André et al. (2009) replacing Bertrand with Cournot behaviour to show that firms may spontaneously adopt a green technology even in the complete absence of any form of regulation

We extend the analysis carried out by Valletti (2000) by considering an environmental externality in a vertically differentiated duopoly where firms compete à la Cournot with fixed costs of quality improvement.We show that, if the weight of the external effect is high enough, the resulting...

In the framework of a vertically differentiated mixed duopoly, with uncovered market and costless quality choice, we study the existence of a price equilibrium when a welfare-maximizing public firm producing low quality goods competes against a profit-maximizing private firm producing high...

Shaked and Sutton (1982) and Gelman and Salop (1983) are best remembered for their neat conclusions: a limited quality or limited capacity is an effective tool to relax competition and facilitate entry in a market. We aim at comparing the respective merits of these two strategic commitments. We...

We compare a Bertrand with a Cournot duopoly in a setting where production is polluting and exploits natural resources, and firms bear convex production costs. We adopt Dastidar's (1995) approach, yielding a continuum of Bertrand-Nash equilibria ranging above marginal cost pricing also, to show...