In a Baron-Myerson setup, we study a situation where an agent is initially uninformed, but can, at a cost, acquire information about the state of nature before the principal offers him a contract.

We modify a standard Baron-Myerson model by assuming that, instead of knowing the cost of nature, the agent has to incur a cost "c" to learn it. Under these conditions, the principal will offer contracts that, dependind on the value of "c", try to induce the agent to gather or not information....

More than thirty years ago Milton Friedman proposed a 'plucking' model of business fluctuations in which output cannot exceed a ceiling level, but will, from time to time, be plucked downward by recession. The model implied that business fluctuations are asymmetric, that recessions have only a...

In a Baron-Myerson setup, we study a situation where an agent is initially uninformed, but can, at a cost, acquire information about the state of nature before the principal offers him a contract.

More than thirty years ago Milton Friedman proposed a 'plucking' model of business fluctuations in which output cannot exceed a ceiling level, but will, from time to time, be plucked downward by recession. The model implied that business fluctuations are asymmetric, that recessions have only a...

We develop a model which is intended to accurately portray the behavior of the key players in this drama centering on the survival of the black rhinos and we estimate the optimal prices and quantities of rhino horn delivered to the market which will result in the preservation of the black rhino...

We develop a model which is intended to accurately portray the behavior of the key players in this drama centering on the survival of the black rhinos and we estimate the optimal prices and quantities of rhino horn delivered to the market which will result in the preservation of the black rhino...

We modify a standard Baron-Myerson model by assuming that, instead of knowing the cost of nature, the agent has to incur a cost "c" to learn it. Under these conditions, the principal will offer contracts that, dependind on the value of "c", try to induce the agent to gather or not information....