We test competing explanations for contributions in social dilemma games. Hypotheses are classified in two ways : bgy key concept and by strategy sensitivity.

In the context of the provision of one pure public good, we raise the following question : how large can a preference domain be to allow for the existence fo strategy-proof rules satisfying the no vetoer condition? This question is qualified by the additional requirement that a domain should...

We study the effects of a change in some exogenous variable (the fixed cost or a parameter in the payoff functions) on the strategies played in a Symmetric Cournot Equilibrium with Free Entry (SCEFE). We also show that any observation on prices, profits and number of firms is compatible with the...

A logico-linguistic model is put forward to represent players' knowledge and beliefs.

We consider social choice rules which select a lottery over outcomes for each progile of individual preferences. Agents are assumed to have preferences over lotteries satisfying the axioms of expected utility. We exhibit a large class of rules satisfying strategy- proofness.

We analyze a stochastic versions of the Rubinstein bargaining model with outside options available to both the proposer and the responder.

This study welcomes the assumption that players respect the recommendations made by any given Equilibrium Selction Theory when the game played "suggests" no other alternative and evident way to play.

This paper analyzes an evolutionary model where agents who are locally matched to play a general coordination game can adjust both their strategy and location. These decisions are subject to friction, so that an agent who migrates to a different location may be unable to adjust her strategy...