Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Rules for Expected Utility Maximizers.

We consider social choice rules which select a lottery over outcomes for each progile of individual preferences. Agents are assumed to have preferences over lotteries satisfying the axioms of expected utility. We exhibit a large class of rules satisfying strategy- proofness.

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Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Barbera, S ; Bogomolnaia, A ; van der Stel, H
Institutions:	Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Subject:	ECONOMIC THEORY \| ECONOMIC MODELS

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Series:	UFAE and IAE Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	19 pages
Classification:	C51 - Model Construction and Estimation
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572191