Measuring and allocating risk properly are crucial for performance evaluation and internal capital allocation of portfolios held by banks, insurance companies, investment funds and other entities subject to financial risk. We show that by using a coherent measure of risk it is impossible to...

We generalize exactness to games with non-transferable utility (NTU). A game is exact if for each coalition there is a core allocation on the boundary of its payoff set. Convex games with transferable utility are well-known to be exact. We consider ve generalizations of convexity in the NTU...

A pénzügyekben mind elméletileg, mind az alkalmazások szempontjából fontos kérdés a tőkeallokáció. Hogyan osszuk szét egy adott portfólió kockázatát annak alportfóliói között? Miként tartalékoljunk tőkét a fennálló kockázatok fedezetére, és a tartalékokat hogyan...

A hálózatok társadalmi és gazdasági jelentősége vitathatatlan, alkalmazásai pedig szerteágazóak. A kutatási együttműködések hálózata is fontos, négyünk ezen cikkbeli együttműködésének itt csak két okát szeretnénk kiemelni. Egyrészt idén 10 éves Jackson és Watts...

A kockázat jó mérése és elosztása elengedhetetlen a bankok, biztosítók, befektetési alapok és egyéb pénzügyi vállalkozások belső tőkeallokációjához vagy teljesítményértékeléséhez. A cikkben bemutatjuk, hogy a koherens kockázati mértékek axiómáit nem likvid...

Measuring and allocating risk properly are crucial for performance evaluation and internal capital allocation of portfolios held by banks, insurance companies, investment funds and other entities subject to financial risk. We show that by using coherent measures of risk it is impossible to...

In finance risk capital allocation raises important questions both from theoretical and practical points of view. How to share risk of a portfolio among its subportfolios? How to reserve capital in order to hedge existing risk and how to assign this to different business units? We use an...

Taking advantage of ambiguity in strategic situations is well documented in the literature. However, so far there are only few results on how to make ambiguous strategies. In this paper we introduce a procedure which makes objective ambiguity, concretely it draws an element from a set of priors,...

We consider transferable utility cooperative games with infinitely many players and the core understood in the space of bounded additive set functions. We show that, if a game is bounded below, then its core is non-empty if and only if the game is balanced. This finding generalizes Schmeidler...

We consider transferable utility cooperative games with infinitely many players. In particular, we generalize the notions of core and balancedness, and also the Bondareva–Shapley Theorem for infinite TU games with and without restricted cooperation, to the cases where the core consists of...