This paper models the competition of user networks as a continuous-time Markov process. It presents a dynamic version of the Discrete Choice Analysis with state-dependent choice probabilities. Among other things, we show that the network competition can be characterized by the coexistence of...

This paper models the competition of user networks as a continuous-time Markov process. It presents a dynamic version of the Discrete Choice Analysis with state-dependent choice probabilities. Among other things, we show that the network competition can be characterized by the coexistence of...

We develop models of markets with procrastinating consumers where competition operates - or is supposed to operate - both through the initial selection of providers and through the possibility of switching providers. As in other work, consumers fail to switch to better options after signing up...

When firms' shrouding of charges, as in Gabaix and Laibson (2006), meets with consumers' salient thinking, as in Bordalo et al. (2013), this can have severe welfare implications. The ensuing excessive competition for headline prices tends to inefficiently bias consumers' choice towards...

In product markets, there exists substantial dispersion in prices for transactions of physically identical goods, and incumbent sellers sell at higher prices than entrants. This study develops a theory of dynamic pricing that explains these facts as results from the same fundamental friction:...

When preferences are sensitive to context, firms may try to influence purchase decisions by designing the environment of consumption choices. Confirming anecdotal evidence on retailer marketing tricks, we show that competitive retailers exploit context-sensitivity by designing environments that...

Portuguese Abstract: Exploramos vários jogos diferenciais para simular a competição entre duas firmas em Preço, Publicidade, e Preço e Publicidade simultâneamente. Os resultados reforçam conclusões importantes na literatura e complementam-na, permitindo analisar a competição em dois...

This is a ready-to-read version of my previous paper ‘Deciphering the Two-Sided Market Model of Rochet and Tirole’. It blows away the smokescreen of logical disorder, incoherent language and mathematical sophistication of the original article by rephrasing the model in clear language,...

This paper analyzes dynamic equilibrium risk sharing contracts between profit-maximizing intermediaries and a large pool of ex-ante identical agents that face idiosyncratic income uncertainty that makes them heterogeneous ex-post. In any given period, after having observed her income, the agent...