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In this paper we set forth a new perspective from which to understand and measure the brokerage of asymmetric information that intermediaries usually carry out. Firstly, we deal with partitions of a given set so as to lay grounds to our line of research. Secondly, we argue that trade splits up...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014224726
Consider an investment problem with strategic complementarities and incomplete information about returns. This paper shows that investors aggregate their private information in equilibrium by trading a token and observing its market price over multiple rounds before making the investment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014239114
Neeman (2004) and Heifetz and Neeman (2006) have shown that, in auctions with incomplete information about payoffs, full surplus extraction is only possible if agents’ beliefs about other agents are fully informative about their own payoff parameters. They argue that the set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010230371
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009782964
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The psychology literature provides ample evidence that people have difficulties taking the perspective of less-informed others. This paper presents a controlled experiment showing that this "curse of knowledge" can cause comparative overconfidence and overentry into competition. In a broader...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010403249
In Bayesian environments with private information, as described by the types of Harsanyi, how can types of agents be (statistically) disassociated from each other and how are such disassociations reflected in the agents’ knowledge structure? Conditions studied are (i) subjective independence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003873501
The ability of markets to aggregate information through prices is examined in a dynamic environment with unawareness. We find that if all traders are able to minimally update their awareness when they observe a price that is counterfactual to their private information, they will eventually reach...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012850568
We study the general problem of Bayesian persuasion (optimal information design) with continuous actions and continuous state space in arbitrary dimensions. First, we show that with a finite signal space, the optimal information design is always given by a partition. Second, we take the limit of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012487719
We study a principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection. Risk-neutral agents with limited liability have arbitrary private information about the distribution of outputs and the cost of effort. We show that under a multiplicative separability condition, the optimal mechanism...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013327130