Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard
Year of publication: |
2022
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Authors: | Gottlieb, Daniel ; Moreira, Humberto |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 17.2022, 3, p. 1357-1401
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Subject: | contract theory | mechanism design | Principal-agent problem | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
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