We study markets for sensitive personal information. An agent wants to communicate with another party but any revealed information can be intercepted and sold to a third party whose reaction harms the agent. The market for information induces an adverse sorting effect, allocating the information...

We study markets for sensitive personal information. An agent wants to communicate with another party but any revealed information can be intercepted and sold to a third party whose reaction harms the agent. The market for information induces an adverse sorting effect, allocating the information...

We present a novel approach to finite Rational Inattention (RI) models based on the ignorance equivalent, a fictitious action with state-dependent payoffs that effectively summarizes the optimal learning and conditional choices. The ignorance equivalent allows us to recast the RI problem as a...

The traditional information paradigm postulates that increasing the amount of information and establishing full transparency helps consumers with their decisions. We challenge this assumption and address criteria that good consumer information needs to fulfil. Based on the findings from research...

In "Marketing Information: A Competitive Analysis,'' Sarvary and Parker (1997) (S&P) [Marketing Science, 16(1): 24-38] argue that, a reduction in the price of one information product can lead to an increase in demand for another information product -- information products can be gross...

In "Marketing Information: A Competitive Analysis,'' Sarvary and Parker (1997) (S&P) [Marketing Science, 16(1): 24-38] argue that in part of the parameter space that they considered, a reduction in the price of one information product can lead to an increase in demand for another information...

This essay considers the role of reputational information in our marketplace. It explains how well-functioning marketplaces depend on the vibrant flow of accurate reputational information, and how misdirected regulation of reputational information could harm marketplace mechanisms. It then...

Das verbraucherpolitische Instrument Verbraucherberatung soll die asymmetrische Informationsverteilung zwischen Verbrauchern und Unternehmen abbauen und Vertrauen in Märkte schaffen. Bei dieser Aufgabenstellung wird vernachlässigt, dass Verbraucherberatung selbst durch die asymmetrische...

Das verbraucherpolitische Instrument Verbraucherberatung soll die asymmetrische Informationsverteilung zwischen Verbrauchern und Unternehmen abbauen und Vertrauen in Märkte schaffen. Bei dieser Aufgabenstellung wird vernachlässigt, dass Verbraucherberatung selbst durch die asymmetrische...

It is not unusual in real-life that one has to choose among finitely many alternatives when the merit of each alternative is not perfectly known. This may be the case when an individual chooses school, doctor or pension plan, or when a firm chooses between alternative R&D projects. Instead of...