An entrepreneur contracts with a consultant, who is protected by limited liability, to supply information about the … probability than a bad one. The entrepreneur makes an upfront payment that the consultant can either invest in information … entrepreneurs so long as his referrals remain high. The principal under-utilizes information in settings (i) and (ii). In setting …

We investigate strategic information transmission with communication error, or noise. Our main finding is that adding … it possible to achieve the best payoff that can be obtained by means of any communication device. As in the model without …

We develop a dynamic framework of strategic information transmission through cheap talk in a social network. Privately …) equilibrium. Fully informative myopic and farsighted equilibria essentially take a particular simple form: all communication is … and analyze equilibrium welfare. Furthermore, we extend our model to public communication and investigate the implications …

An entrepreneur contracts with a consultant, who is protected by limited liability, to supply information about the … probability than a bad one. The entrepreneur makes an upfront payment that the consultant can either invest in information … entrepreneurs so long as his informal referrals remain high. The principal finds it optimal to under-utilize information if she uses …