We analyze the relationship between managerial ownership and company performance, testing the incentive and entrenchment hypothesis. Differently from previous literature, we focus on small and medium-sized private enterprises which constitute an important part of the German economy. We use a...

Der vorliegende Aufsatz untersucht den Einfluss von Aufsichtsratsvernetzungen auf die Entwicklung der Vorstandsbezüge von DAX-Unternehmen. Die kombinierte Anwendung von Methoden der sozialen Netzwerkanalyse und der Panelökonometrie erleichtert die Erfassung der Struktur der...

By means of a simple economic model, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) describe how top managers can entrench themselves by specific overinvestment. An extension of the model with additional investments exposes interdependencies that exceed the primary value of explanation. The extension of the model...

Auf Grundlage eines großen kombinierten Firmen-Beschäftigten-Datensatzes untersuchen wir Unterschiede im unerklärten geschlechtsspezifischen Lohndifferential zwischen eigentümer- und managergeführten Betrieben für Deutschland. Wir stellen die Hypothese auf, dass eigentümergeführte...

This paper examines how CEO pay is related to firm size and to firm performance in Finland by using new individual-level compensation data in 1996-2002. We find robust evidence that CEO average compensation has increased substantially between 1996 and 2002. For example, the ratio between CEO and...

An important literature has made a fundamental link between corporate governance and corporate strategy. According to agency theory, assigning managers stock options aligns their interests with the interests of the owners of the firm. This paper suggests that this may not apply in the context of...

During the transition from plan to market, managers and politicians succeeded in maintaining control of large parts of the stock of socialist physical capital. Despite the obvious importance of this phenomenon, there have been no efforts to model, measure and investigate this process...

The promotion tournament as a potentially important incentive mechanism for top management in transition economies has not been examined by the emerging literature on managerial incentives in transition economies. This paper is the first attempt to fill this important gap in the literature. The...