We develop a model in which multinational investors decide about the modes of organization, the locations of production, and the markets to be served. Foreign investments are driven by market-seeking and cost-reducing motives. We further assume that investors face costs of control that vary...

This paper presents theory and evidence showing that institutional reforms in developing countries can effectively expand their product varieties in export. Our model demonstrates that relaxing foreign ownership controls and improving contract enforcement can induce multinational companies to...

A hierarchically structured rent-seeking contest may be associated with lower equilibrium expenditure than a corresponding flat contest. In this chapter we discuss how this fact may be used to explain the structure of organizations such as firms, including why firms commonly have outside owners.

We develop a model in which multinational investors decide about the modes of organization, the locations of production, and the markets to be served. Foreign investments are driven by market-seeking and cost-reducing motives. We further assume that investors face costs of control that vary...

We develop a model in which multinational investors decide about the modes of organization, the locations of production, and the markets to be served. Foreign investments are driven by market-seeking and cost-reducing motives. We further assume that investors face costs of control that vary...

Seminal theories of the firm posit that firm ownership is allocated to minimize contractual inefficiencies. Yet, it remains unclear how much the optimal ownership choice affects firm performance in practice. This paper provides a first quantification of the gains from optimal ownership within...

We analyze the interplay between product market prices and firm boundary decisions. Enterprises are heterogeneous with respect to their productivities and each enterprise chooses between two ownership structures--centralized ownership (integration) performs well in coordinating managerial...

By the time a young Ronald Coase was composing “The Nature of the Firm” (1937), litigation had already started wending its way through American courts that took up questions that really anticipated Grossman, Hart and Moore on control rights and Simon and Williamson on adaptation, vertical...

The paper studies agents' investment decisions between general and specific investments under different ownership structures in a thin, decentralized market where each agent's decision affects the decisions and welfare of other (otherwise unrelated) agents mainly through indirect market...

It is well-known that a seller imposed non-discrimination clause can soften downstream price competition by constraining opportunistic pricing behavior on the part of an upstream monopolist seller. But what about about market settings in which there exists a pivotal buyer? We show that in the...