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This paper develops characterizations of identified sets of structures and structural features for complete and incomplete models involving continuous or discrete variables. Multiple values of unobserved variables can be associated with particular combinations of observed variables. This can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011594354
An incomplete model of English auctions with symmetric independent private values, similar to the one studied in Haile and Tamer (2003), is shown to fall in the class of Generalized Instrumental Variable Models introduced in Chesher and Rosen (2014). A characterization of the sharp identi.ed set...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011445738
An incomplete model of English auctions with symmetric independent private values, similar to the one studied in Haile and Tamer (2003), is shown to fall in the class of Generalized Instrumental Variable Models introduced in Chesher and Rosen (2014). A characterization of the sharp identi.ed set...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011285392
This paper develops characterizations of identified sets of structures and structural features for complete and incomplete models involving continuous or discrete variables. Multiple values of unobserved variables can be associated with particular combinations of observed variables. This can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011525866
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011949355
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011778835
The behavioral properties of several auctions designed to elicit individual valuations for an object are studied using controlled laboratory experiments. Our experiments lead us to conclude that there are some behavioral differences between alternative incentive-compatible institutions for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005375687
This paper tests experimentally, in a common value setting, the equivalence between the Japanese English auction (or clock auction) and an open outcry auction, where bidders are allowed to call their own bids. We find that (i) bidding behaviour is different in each type of auction, but also that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328576
Within the independent private-values paradigm, we derive the data-generating process of the winning bid for the last unit sold at multi-unit, sequential English auctions when bidder valuations are draws from different distributions; i.e., in the presence of asymmetries. When the identity of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005345301
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013483810