English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem

We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for environments where it has not been previously obtained. We also prove two versions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, one for economies with n goods and n factors, and one for non-square economies. Similar assumptions and methods underlie these seemingly unrelated results.

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Year of publication:	2007-11-15
Authors:	Dubra, Juan ; Echenique, Federico ; Manelli, Alejandro
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	English auctions \| Stolper-Samuelson \| single crossing

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	MPRA Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	F11 - Neoclassical Models of Trade ; D44 - Auctions ; C60 - Mathematical Methods and Programming. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005616606