In this paper, a promotion tournament is considered, where, at the beginning of the tournament, it is unknown how long the tournament lasts. Further, the promotion decision is based on the assessments of a supervisor with imperfect recall. In line with psychological research, the supervisor is...

In a multi-task, market-based promotion tournament model, under different environments concerning employer learning about worker ability, it is shown that:i) Asymmetric learning in multi-task jobs is a necessary condition for "strategic shirking" (i.e., underperforming on certain tasks to...

We investigate how the decision of workers to join a specific type of firm affects their future career opportunities. Workers can either join a very competitive firm (big pond) or a less competitive one (small pond). In a big pond, it is more difficult to advance, but the potential rewards are...

We provide a theoretical analysis of promotion tournaments in which workers 'strategically shirk' by purposely under-performing on tasks that are de-emphasized in a promotion rule, while over-performing in tasks that are emphasized in the rule, thereby increasing their chances of promotion and a...