This paper provides a brief review of the state of knowledge in the field of agency theory. The managerial power approach assumes that a chief executive officer is able to affect the scale of his or her pay. However, Kaplan (2012) and others see a different picture of the corporate-governance...

In this study, we examine whether the levels and structures of top executive compensation vary discernibly with different levels of board independence. We also examine how the newly mandated adoption of the remuneration committee (RC) in Taiwan affects the board independence-executive pay...

This study analyzes the problem of high or runaway CEO pay packages. These packages reflect substantial lapses of corporate governance by the corporate boards of directors that award the excessive pay. A combination of shareholder impotence, director self-interest and CEO domination has rendered...

n this paper we examine the agency costs of seemingly excessive pay awards to CEO's within the FTSE 100 in the last decade. Are CEOs taking a large proportion of the total pot (a big "pay slice") more, or less, able to return value to shareholders by better management? In presenting this...

We analyze how the reputational concerns of boards influence executive compensation and the use of hidden pay. Independent boards reduce disclosed pay to signal their independence, but are more likely to use inefficient hidden pay than manager-friendly boards. Stronger reputational pressures...

Over the period 2005 through 2015, we find that director compensation in Chinese listed firms is influenced by both director characteristics and ownership structure. We measure director compensation by both the propensity to be paid and the level of compensation. For independent directors, we...