This paper analyzes how board independence affects a board's monitoring intensity and the CEO pay disparity. We consider a corporate tournament model with a novel feature that the board of directors may lack independence. This has significant implications for a board's monitoring and rewarding...

This paper studies how hedge fund activism reshapes board monitoring, CEO incentives and compensation. I find that activists target CEOs who have co-opted the board, have poor performance records and weak equity portfolio incentives, are less subject to relative performance evaluation (RPE) but...

This paper empirically examines the determinants of director compensation and CEO compensation and investigates whether director compensation has an effect on CEO compensation. Based on 713 firms (or 2,852 firm-years) between 2007 and 2010, we find that CEO tenure is related to the ability of...

We argue gender-diverse boards are associated with distinct preferences that reassure investors about their commitment to moderate risk and boost long-term corporate survival. Results suggest a strong relation between gender-diverse boards and bondholder-aligned CEO compensation components,...

The most influential theory of corporate governance, principal agency theory, does not take into consideration that the key task of modern corporations is to generate and transfer firm-specific knowledge. It proposes that, in order to overcome the widespread corporate scandals, the interests of...