This paper proposes "expected informativeness," an ex-ante counterpart of a likelihood ratio, in principal-agent models. The principal has an easy task and a difficult task to delegate. The difficult task requires high ability and high effort. It is the first-best outcome to assign tasks...

We propose a simple model of borrower optimism in competitive lending markets with asymmetric information. Borrowers in our model engage in self-deception to arrive at a belief that optimally trades off the anticipatory utility benefits and material costs of optimism. Lenders' contract design...

We propose a simple model of borrower optimism in competitive lending markets with asymmetric information. Borrowers in our model engage in self-deception to arrive at a belief that optimally trades off the anticipatory utility benefits and material costs of optimism. Lenders' contract design...

This paper investigates the optimal design of incentives when agents distort probabilities. We show that the type of probability distortion displayed by the agent and its degree determine whether an incentivecompatible contract can be implemented, the strength of the incentives included in the...

We study a general moral hazard problem wherein the principal does not know the agent’s beliefs about the production technology. The agent, who is risk neutral and enjoys limited liability, makes a one-dimensional choice of effort. The principal understands both the actions available to the...

A theory in which the timing of consumer expectation adjustments is endogenously state-dependent and stochastic is proposed. These expectation adjustments generate highly heterogenous consumption responses to income windfalls: many households do not respond, those who do over-react, the marginal...

Probabilistic job loss expectations elicited in the Consumer Expectations Survey have predictive power for future job loss. We find that an unexpected job loss leads to a negative consumption response, while this effect is muted for workers with ex-ante job loss expectations - consistent with...

We investigate the extent to which misperceptions about the economy can become self-reinforcing and thereby contribute to time-varying macroeconomic dynamics. To do so, we build a New Keynesian model with long-horizon expectations and dynamic predictor selection. Because agents solve...

When financial securities are modeled as claims on stochastic processes, each trader's beliefs at time can be summarized by a subjective probability distribution . The dominant Rational Expectations approach typically treats as a singleton that correctly gauges risks. In reality, financial risks...

Modest differences in higher-order beliefs may have large price effects. We generalize a standard rational expectations equilibrium model with different information by allowing differences in higher-order beliefs. Investors have possibly different dogmatic beliefs about the mean, different...