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Do leniency policies facilitate collusion? Experimental evidence
Clemens, Georg; Rau, Holger A. - 2014
-stage cartel formation experiment where multiple ringleaders may emerge. Although theory predicts that cartels will always be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328002
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Do leniency policies facilitate collusion? : experimental evidence
Clemens, Georg; Rau, Holger A. - 2014
-stage cartel formation experiment where multiple ringleaders may emerge. Although theory predicts that cartels will always be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010228272
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Do leniency policies facilitate collusion? : experimental evidence ; conference paper
Clemens, Georg; Rau, Holger A. - 2014
-stage cartel formation experiment where multiple ringleaders may emerge. Although theory predicts that cartels will always be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487743
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Do leniency policies facilitate collusion? Experimental evidence
Clemens, Georg; Rau, Holger A. - Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), … - 2014
-stage cartel formation experiment where multiple ringleaders may emerge. Although theory predicts that cartels will always be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956793
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Keeping out Trojan horses : auctions and bankruptcy in the laboratory
Onderstal, Sander; Veen, Ailko van der - 2011
If a government auctions the right to market a good, continuity is likely to be of significant importance. In a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383054
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Keeping Out Trojan Horses : Auctions and Bankruptcy in the Laboratory
Onderstal, Sander - 2011
If a government auctions the right to market a good, continuity is likely to be of significant importance. In a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013130292
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Cartel stability in experimental auctions
Hinloopen, Jeroen; Onderstal, Sander; Treuren, Leonard - 2019
Using laboratory experiments, we compare the stability of bidding rings in the English auction and the first-price sealed-bid auction in a heterogeneous-value setting. In both a re-matching condition and a fixed-matching condition, we observe that biddings rings are more stable in the English...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011960510
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Firm-specific information and explicit collusion in experimental oligopolies
Gomez-Martin, Francisco; Onderstal, Sander; Sonnemans, Joep - 2015
to form cartels in Cournot markets. As in previous experiments, markets become very competitive when individualized …: Markets become less competitive and cartels become more stable when individualized information is available. We also observe … information is present, suggesting that firms have greater incentives to form cartels in that situation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010532614
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Trust and recidivism : the partial success of corporate leniency program in the laboratory
Hinloopen, Jeroen; Soetevent, Adriaan - 2006
An experiment is conducted were subjects interact repeatedly to examine the effect of a particular leniency program on cartel formation, cartel stability and cartel recidivism. The program leads to lower prices for three reasons. First, non-cooperators are more persistent in their behavior which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011349188
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Endogenous cartel formation : experimental evidence
Fonseca, Miguel A.; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2014
may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that four-firm industries form cartels more often than duopolies because they …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010401724