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Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Matthews, Peter Hans - 2004

altruism. Instead, we posit that social reciprocity is a triggered normative response. Our experiment confirms the existence of …We define social reciprocity as the act of demonstrating one's disapproval, at some personal cost, for the violation of … widely-held norms (e.g., don't free ride). Social reciprocity differs from standard notions of reciprocity because social …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010271935

The good of the few : reciprocal acts and the provision of a public bad

Delaney, Jason; Jacobson, Sarah - In: Journal of behavioral and experimental economics 58 (2015), pp. 46-55

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011566171

Breaking the rules : anticipation of norm violation in a binary-choice trust game

Breuer, Wolfgang; Helduser, Christiane; Schade, Philipp - In: Economics letters 146 (2016), pp. 123-125

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011619205

Leadership and conditional cooperation in public good games : what difference does the game make?

Cartwright, Edward; Lovett, Denise - 2013

We investigate experimentally whether the extent of conditional cooperation in public good games depends on the marginal return to the public good and type of game. The marginal return is varied from 0.2 to 0.4 to 0.8. The "standard" game, in which three players contribute before a follower, is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010228325

Conditional cooperation and the marginal per capita return in public good games

Cartwright, Edward; Lovett, Denise - In: Games 5 (2014) 4, pp. 234-256

We investigate experimentally whether the extent of conditional cooperation in public good games depends on the marginal per capita return (MPCR) to the public good and type of game. The MPCR is varied from 0.2 to 0.4 to 0.8. The "standard" game, in which three players contribute before a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010503532