This book brings together insights and reflections following a set of interviews conducted with the main stakeholders involved in past, current, and future basic income experiments. It provides an analysis of some of the major elements and factors influencing experiments, as well of some of...

This book consists of eight comparative studies drawn from history, archeology, economics, economic history, geography, and political science. The studies cover a spectrum of approaches, ranging from a non-quantitative narrative style in the early chapters to quantitative statistical analyses in...

Chapter 1. Introduction -- Part 1. What we have learned from the interviews -- Chapter 2. The goal, context, and methods behind our case studies -- Chapter 3. What do our case studies tell us? -- Part 2. New questions the interviews have raised -- Chapter 4. The decision to implement UBI...

Trust games are employed to investigate the effect of heterogeneity in income and race on cooperation in South Africa. The amount of socio-economic information available to the subjects about their counterparts is varied. No significant behavioural differences are observed, when no such...

This paper introduces a two-sided methodological framework for studies on cooperation based on a new game design. Presented games are continuous prisoner's dilemma games with positive and negative presentations of an identically structured decision problem. Decision makers can choose an...

Unlike previous attempts to implement cooperation in a prisoners' dilemma game with an infinite horizon in the laboratory, we focus on extended prisoners' dilemma games in which a second (pure strategy) equilibrium allows for voluntary cooperation in all but the last round. Our four main...

Using a symmetric 2-person prisoners' dilemma as the base game, each player receives a signal for the number of rounds to be played with the same partner. The actual number of rounds (the length of the supergame) is determined by the maximal signal where each player expects the other's signal to...

How can a principal (an agent) ensure that an agent (a principal) will work (pay up), ifpayment (work) precedes work (payment)? When a banknote is torn in two, each part is byitself worthless. A principal can pre-commit to payment-on-delivery, by tearing a banknoteand giving the agent the first...

In this paper, we study a voluntary contribution mechanism withone-way communication. The relevance of one person’s words is assessedby assigning exogeniously the role of the ‘communicator’ to onegroup member. Contrary to the view that the mutual exchange ofpromises is necessary for the...

In experimental economics there exists a lively debate about the independenceof observations. Although opinions on the issue dier widely, allconcerns regard the independence of subjects' behavior within one sessionor experiment. This paper attempts to shed some light on the independenceof...