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Universal collusion and renegotiation, dictators and contracts
Baliga, Sandeep - 1995
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000151779
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Learning from failures : optimal contracts for experimentation and production
Khalil, Fahad; Lawarrée, Jacques; Rodivilov, Alexander - In: Journal of economic theory 190 (2020), pp. 1-44
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012547184
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Subjective performance feedback, ability attribution, and renegotiation-proof contracts
Chen, Bin R. - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 117 (2015), pp. 155-174
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011572037
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Learning from failures : optimal contract for experimentation and production
Khalil, Fahad; Lawarrée, Jacques; Rodivilov, Alexander - 2018
derive the optimal contract for both experimentation and production when the agent has private information about his … asymmetric information is endogenously determined by the length of the experimentation stage. An optimal contract uses the length …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011926023
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Gain versus loss contracts : does contract framing affect agents' reciprocity?
Bieberstein, Frauke von; Essl, Andrea; Friedrich, Kathrin - In: Economics letters 187 (2020), pp. 1-4
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012504311
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Contract choice : efficiency and fairness in revenue‐sharing contracts
Karakostas, Alexandros; Sonntag, Axel; Zizzo, Daniel John - In: The Scandinavian journal of economics 119 (2017) 4, pp. 962-986
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011805615
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Honesty and relational contracts : conference paper
Holger, Herz; Schmutzler, Armin; André, Volk - 2014
We study the economic consequences of opportunities for dishonesty in an environment where efficiency relevant behaviour is not contractible, but rather incentivized by informal agreements in an ongoing relationship. We document the repeated interaction between a principal and an agent who,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010483887
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Monitoring and pay : an experiment on contract design with endogenous monitoring ; conference paper
Dittrich, Dennis; Kocher, Martin - 2014 - Preprint submitted to Draft
We implement a laboratory experiment in which a principal has to decide on monitoring intensity and pay to investigate whether they are complements or substitutes. Wage level, monitoring intensity, and consequently the desired enforceable effort level are jointly determined by the maximization...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010489889
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More than the money : payoff-irrelevant terms in relational contracts
Goerg, Sebastian J.; Ziółkowska, Monika - 2018
two economically equivalent contracts - a fixed-term renewable and an open-ended at-will contract. Each contract provides … contract type. However, when both contracts are available offering a fixed-term instead of an open-ended contract is perceived …We investigate how payoff-irrelevant terms can negatively impact relational contracts. In a lab experiment we compare …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011893426
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Contracting under asymmetric information and externalities : an experimental study
Nieken, Petra; Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic … 26 (2023) 5, pp. 989-1021
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014500450