This paper presents an experiment to test effects of sequential entry on stability of collusion in oligopoly markets. Previous research suggests that the larger the number of firms, the harder it is to sustain collusion. We find that when groups start off small and the entrant is informed about...

Tournament incentive schemes offer payments dependent on relative performance and thereby are intended to motivate agents to exert productive effort. Unfortunately, however, an agent may also be tempted to destroy the production of his competitors in order to improve the own relative position....

This paper studies how pay transparency affects organizations that reward employees based on their efforts (i.e., using "subjective performance evaluation"). First, we show that transparency triggers social comparisons that require the organization to pay its employees an "envy premium". This...

This paper studies how pay transparency affects organizations that reward employees based on their efforts (i.e., using "subjective performance evaluation"). First, we show that transparency triggers social comparisons that require the organization to pay its employees an "envy premium". This...

The theoretical approach in dealing with the aggregation of information in markets in general, and financial markets in particular considers information as an exogenous element to the system, focusing just on conditions and consequences of the efficient incorporation of information into prices....

We explore the efficiency and distributive implications (theoretically and experimentally) of a multilateral bargaining model with endogenous production of the surplus under two different timings: ex ante and ex post bargaining. Both timings are commonly observed in business partnerships and...