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Official A at almost all individual detection levels. This 'legitimacy' effect may help explain why anti-corruption policies …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011568192
The Plan Nacional de Vigilancia Comunitaria por Cuadrantes (PNVCC) is a new police patrolling program introduced in the … eight major cities of Colombia in 2010 by the National Police. The strategy divides the largest cities into small … for over 9,000 police officers aimed at improving interpersonal skills and implementation of the new patrolling protocols …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014160148
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It is estimated that a trillion dollars are annually exchanged in bribes, distorting justice and economic efficiency …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011455840
In a bribery experiment, we test the hypothesis that distributive fairness considerations make relatively well-paid public officials less corruptible. Corrupt decisions impose damages to workers whose wage is varied in two treatments. However, there is no apparent difference in behaviour.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538846
Unfair intentions provoke negative reciprocity from others, making their concealment potentially beneficial. This paper explores whether people hide their unfair intentions from others and how hiding intentions is itself perceived in fairness terms. Our experimental data show a high frequency of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010483596
This paper investigates the driving forces behind informal sanctions in cooperation games and the extent to which theories of fairness and reciprocity capture these forces. We find that cooperators' punishment is almost exclusively targeted towards the defectors but the latter also impose a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003031484
This paper develops a positive model of informal contracting in which rewards and punishments are not determined by an ex ante optimal plan but instead express the ex post moral sentiments of the arbitrating party. We consider a subjective performance evaluation problem in which a principal can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671838
We introduce the moonlighting game. Player A can take money from or pass money to player B, who can either return money or punish player A. Thus, our game allows to study both positively and negatively reciprocal behaviour. One-shot experiments were conducted with and without the possibility of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014141311