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This article examines the nature of human behavior in a nested socialdilemma referred to as the Spillover Game. Players are divided into twogroups with positive production interdependencies. Based on theoreticallyderived opportunistic, local, and global optima, our experimental...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009022157
laboratory experiment we test the different theories by systematically varying information conditions. We find significant …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366552
. In a laboratory experiment we test the different theories by systematically varying information conditions. We find that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270576
A well-known result by Vega-Redondo implies that in symmetric Cournot oligopoly, imitation leads to the Walrasian outcome where price equals marginal cost. In this paper we show that this result is not robust to the slightest asymmetry in fixed costs. Instead of obtaining the Walrasian outcome...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003593007
laboratory experiment we test the different theories by systematically varying information conditions. We find significant …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003023525
participants make a single provision decision. Data was collected using three "data collection processes": an online experiment … conducted on Prolific, an online experiment conducted with a subject pool of university students, and an experiment implemented …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014299587
We study the effects of leadership on the private provision of a public good when group members are heterogeneously endowed. Leadership is implemented as a sequential public goods game where one group member contributes first and all the others follow. Our results show that the presence of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866855
We analysed dyads strategies in one-shot public goods game. By means of a laboratory experiment, using a variant of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011571212
We analyse two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute than the others. If contributions constitute a sacrifice for the strong player, the other team members are more inclined to cooperate than if contributions are strictly dominant for the strong player.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266960
In this paper, we study a voluntary contribution mechanism withone-way communication. The relevance of one person’s words is assessedby assigning exogeniously the role of the ‘communicator’ to onegroup member. Contrary to the view that the mutual exchange ofpromises is necessary for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009022164