Similar Search Results

Voting on Thresholds for Public Goods: Experimental Evidence

Rauchdobler, Julian; Sausgruber, Rupert; Tyran, Jean-Robert - In: FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis 66 (2010) 1, pp. 34-64

Introducing a threshold in the sense of a minimal project size transforms a public-good game with an inefficient … thresholds are ineffective at best and often counterproductive. This holds over a range of threshold levels and refund rates. We … test whether thresholds perform better if they are endogenously chosen, i.e., whether a threshold is approved in a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010625733

Communication in asymmetric group competition over public goods

Zhang, Jingjing - 2012

This paper examines whether and how cheap talk communication can facilitate within-group coordination when two unequal sized groups compete for a prize that is shared equally among members of the winning group, regardless of their (costly) contributions to the group's success. We find that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316824

Communication in Asymmetric Group Competition over Public Goods

Zhang, Jingjing - Department of Economics, McMaster University - 2009

This paper examines whether and how communication can help groups solve coordination and free-rider problems when they compete with another group for a public-good prize. We find that when group members make an anonymous individual decision on whether or not to contribute to the group success,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008528456

Bargaining in the Presence of Condorcet Cycles: The Role of Asymmetries

Kamm, Aaron; Houba, Harold - 2015

This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment studying the role of asymmetries, both in payoffs and recognition probabilities, in a model of strategic bargaining with Condorcet cycles. Overall, we find only limited support for the equilibrium predictions. The main deviations from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011288420

How transparency kills information aggregation : (and why that may be a good thing) ; conference paper

Fehrler, Sebastian; Hughes, Niall - 2014

We show theoretical and experimental results that demonstrate the potential of transparency to influence committee decision making and deliberation. We present a model in which committee members have career concerns and unanimity is needed to change the status quo. We study three scenarios -...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010486059

The Provision of Public Goods with Positive GroupInterdependencies

Güth, Werner; Sääksvuori, Lauri - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2010

This article examines the nature of human behavior in a nested socialdilemma referred to as the Spillover Game. Players are divided into twogroups with positive production interdependencies. Based on theoreticallyderived opportunistic, local, and global optima, our experimental...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009022157

Leading by Words: A Voluntary Contribution ExperimentWith One-Way Communication

Koukoumelis, Anastasios; Levati, M. Vittoria; Weisser, … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2009

In this paper, we study a voluntary contribution mechanism withone-way communication. The relevance of one person’s words is assessedby assigning exogeniously the role of the ‘communicator’ to onegroup member. Contrary to the view that the mutual exchange ofpromises is necessary for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009022164

Motives of sanctioning: Equity and emotions in a public good experiment with punishment

Crosetto, Paolo; Güth, Werner; Mittone, Luigi; Ploner, … - 2012

We study conditional cooperation based on a sequential two-person linear public good game in which a trusting first contributor can be exploited by a second contributor. After playing this game the first contributor is allowed to punish the second contributor. The consequences of sanctioning...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291837

Leading with(out) sacrifice? A public-goods experiment with a super-additive player

Glöckner, Andreas; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Kube, Sebastian; … - 2009

We analyse two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute than the others. If contributions constitute a sacrifice for the strong player, the other team members are more inclined to cooperate than if contributions are strictly dominant for the strong player.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266960

No response to changes in marginal incentives in one-shot public good experiments

Struwe, Natalie; Blanco, Esther; Walker, James - 2023

group earnings. Based on a total sample size of 952 participants, we find that, unlike results from previous experiments …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014374643