-cost firm under incomplete information: a separating auction implies adverse selection and relies substantially on commitment to … allocation and transfer rules. A pooling auction serves as a commitment device against ex-post opportunistic behavior and … alleviates adverse selection. It can earn the investor a higher expected payoff than a separating auction, even when consistency …

This paper studies how bidding strategies and auction outcomes are affected by downstream competition, particularly for … USFS timber auctions. This is done by extending the auction estimation literature to a model where outside competition … affects bidding behavior in that bidders are then not only concerned with whether they win the auction, but also the identity …

This paper examines a Cournot game where capacity constraints are determined in an auction prior to the market … ascending proxy auction developed in Ranger (2004) is shown to lead to an efficient allocation. It is efficient and … strategically simple for the bidding firms. Furthermore, the auction is designed to allow the explicit inclusion of auctioneer …

used routinely by numerous firms. Considerable research has been conducted to ascertain auction formats that generate the …

-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities. This condition shows that the generic equilibrium of … the standard all-pay auction is robust to the introduction of "small" identity-dependent externalities. In general … of equilibria of the first-price all-pay auction with complete information. With identity-dependent externalities …

-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities. This condition shows that the generic equilibrium of … the standard all-pay auction is robust to the introduction of "small" identity-dependent externalities. In general … of equilibria of the first-price all-pay auction with complete information. With identity-dependent externalities …

stability and fairness. Nevertheless, some auction outcome must be chosen. We separate deviations into two types: deviations by …

We consider an auction setting in which potential buyers, even if they fail to obtain the good, care about the price … paid by the winner. We study the impact of these price-externalities on the first-price auction and the second …-price auction in a symmetric information framework. First, we consider situations in which bidders care about the price paid …