. This paper argues that these inefficiencies can be avoided by asking bidders prior to the auction to submit any public … before the auction itself takes place. …

Recent literature has shown that all-pay auctions raise more money for charity than winner-pay auctions. We demonstrate … different distributions. Furthermore, we also analyze second-price all-pay auction. Finally, we show that individual minimum … bids could improve the relative revenue performance of first-price all-pay compared to first-price winner-pay auction …

seriously considered when one wants to organize a charity auction. …Recent papers show that all-pay auctions are better at raising money for charity than first-price auctions with … complete information. In this paper, we consider a framework on charity auctions with asymmetric bidders under some incomplete …

, however, efficiency may no longer be guaranteed. This paper develops an ascending price auction based on Ausubel & Milgrom … (2002)'s package auction that posesses an efficient Nash equilibrium in pure strategies leading to a core allocation. No …, truthful revelation of valuations is found to a dominant strategy. The auction can be augmented to include explicitly the …

stability and fairness. Nevertheless, some auction outcome must be chosen. We separate deviations into two types: deviations by …

We analyze optimal auction design in the presence of negative externalities. We assume that externalities are a …

We consider an auction setting in which potential buyers, even if they fail to obtain the good, care about the price … paid by the winner. We study the impact of these price-externalities on the first-price auction and the second …-price auction in a symmetric information framework. First, we consider situations in which bidders care about the price paid …

Two experimental treatments are used to study the effects of auction risk across five mechanisms. The first canonical … neutral Nash equilibrium is prevalent in all common auction mechanisms except for the English auction. We do not find evidence …