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This paper presents a unified theory of both the level and sensitivity of pay in competitive market equilibrium, by embedding a moral hazard problem into a talent assignment model. By considering multiplicative specifications for the CEO's utility and production functions, we generate a number...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013134149
This paper develops a simple competitive model of CEO pay. A large part of the rise in CEO compensation in the US economy is explained without assuming managerial entrenchment, mishandling of options, or theft. CEOs have observable managerial talent and are matched to assets in a competitive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012727167
This paper develops a simple equilibrium model of CEO pay. CEOs have different talents and are matched to firms in a competitive assignment model. In market equilibrium, a CEO%u2019s pay changes one for one with aggregate firm size, while changing much less with the size of his own firm. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012779748
This paper develops a simple equilibrium model of CEO pay. CEOs have differenttalents and are matched to firms in a competitive assignment model. In market equilib-rium, a CEO s pay changes one for one with aggregate firm size, while changing muchless with the size of his own firm. The model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012769304