This study investigates whether information about Chief Executive Officer (CEO) incentives is useful for predicting future earnings. We find that in companies with higher CEO equity incentives, current year earnings are more informative of future earnings than in other companies. Additionally,...

Managers have great discretion in determining management forecast characteristics, but little is known about how managerial incentives affect these characteristics. In this paper, we examine whether managers strategically choose the precision of their earnings forecasts for self-serving...

Managers have great discretion in determining forecast characteristics, but little is known about how managerial incentives affect these characteristics. This paper examines whether managers strategically choose forecast precision for self-serving purposes. Building on the prior finding that the...

In this paper shareholders face the trade-off between providing managers with incentives to exert beneficial effort and to engage in costly fraudulent activity. We solve for the optimal compensation package, given that shareholders can either grant (restricted) stock or stock options and given...

In Unternehmen mit Trennung von Eigentum und Leitung stellt sich für die Unternehmenseigner das Problem der Steuerung der Geschäftsführung. Im Vordergrund steht dabei die strategische Erwägung, daß die Geschäftsführung in ausreichendem Maße in die Erhaltung der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit des...