We investigate the risk choices of risk averse CEOs. Following recent theoretical work, we expect CEO risk aversion to be more pronounced in firms with high leverage, or high default probability. We find that the CEOs of these firms reduce firm risk, even in the presence of strong risk taking...

This study investigates whether information about Chief Executive Officer (CEO) incentives is useful for predicting future earnings. We find that in companies with higher CEO equity incentives, current year earnings are more informative of future earnings than in other companies. Additionally,...

We show that long-term compensation is associated with higher pay in the financial industry and the legal sector. Then, using a detailed survey of law school graduates, we explore why firms use long-term compensation. We find that individuals with jobs that make them highly visible and that...

Skilled labour has gained significance as a production factor in the age of information technology, but accounting does not recognize human capital as an asset that contributes to the firm's earning power. This paper suggests a method to develop a latent index to proxy the managerial-skill...

We provide evidence that CEO equity incentives, especially stock options, influence stock liquidity risk via information disclosure quality. We document a negative association between CEO options and the quality of future managerial disclosure policy. Contributing to the literature on CEO...

Skilled labour has gained significance as a production factor in the age of information technology, but accounting does not recognize human capital as an asset that contributes to the firm's earning power. This paper suggests a method to develop a latent index to proxy the managerial-skill...

Because each of the agent's multitasks can have several measures, the multitask agency theory predicts that incentive devices based on these measures can be complements or substitutes. However, the existing empirical literature on multitask agency considers only complementarity. This paper...

The multitask agency theory argues that incentive devices for the agent need to be viewed as a system to induce balanced allocation of effort among the tasks. This important insight has not been incorporated into the empirical study of CEO compensation. Since there can be several measures for...