We use a unique dataset of European performance-fee mutual funds to examine the interaction between explicit incentives (performance fees) and implicit incentives (fund flows) of asset managers. Funds with performance fees face substantially steeper implicit incentives compared to...

Mutual fund managers' compensation packages often contain relative performance-dependent components such as year-end bonus. We examine the incentive effect of such compensation structure using a dynamic trading model with uncertain expected return and costly information. We show that relative...

We provide evidence that CEO equity incentives, especially stock options, influence stock liquidity risk via information disclosure quality. We document a negative association between CEO options and the quality of future managerial disclosure policy. Contributing to the literature on CEO...

This paper solves the dynamic investment problem of a risk averse agent compensated with a performance related bonus plus a salary guaranteed up to a certain level of underperformance. The main contribution is to explicitly take into account the financial fragility of the principal [employer],...

Motivated by psychological evidence that self-esteem plays an important role in individual decision-making, this paper studies how self-esteem concerns influence a manager's effort choice and hedging behavior and how a board designs the managerial compensation in response. We show that when the...

Standard principal-agent theory predicts that large firms should not use employee stock options and other stock-based compensation to provide incentives to non-executive employees. Yet, business practitioners appear to believe that stock-based compensation improves incentives, and mounting...

Relative performance evaluation (RPE) is, at least on paper, enjoying widespread popularity in determining the level of executive compensation. Yet existing empirical evidence of RPE is decidedly mixed. Two principal explanations are held responsible for this discord. A constructional challenge...

We examine optimal managerial compensation and turnover policy in a principal-agent model in which the firm output is serially correlated over time. The model captures a learning-by-doing feature: higher effort by the manager increases the quality of the match between the firm and the manager in...

Relative performance evaluation (RPE) is, at least on paper, enjoying widespread popularity in determining the level of executive compensation. Yet existing empirical evidence of RPE is decidedly mixed. Two principal explanations are held responsible for this discord. A constructional challenge...

We consider a model of CEO selection, dismissal and retention. Firms with larger blockholder ownership monitor more; they get more information about CEO ability, which facilitates the dismissal of low-ability CEOs. These firms are matched with CEOs whose ability is more uncertain. For retention...