Having information about an uncertain event is crucial for informed decision-making. This paper introduces a simple framework in which 1) a principal uses the reported beliefs of multiple agents to make a decision and 2) the agents reporting a belief are affected by the decision. Naturally, the...

Assume in a 2-person game that one player, Predictor (P), does not have a dominant strategy but can predict with probability p 1/2 the strategy choice of an opponent, Predictee (Q). Q chooses a strategy that maximizes her expected payoff, given that she knows p—but not P's prediction—and...

We examine the allocation of a limited pool of matching funds to public good projects using Quadratic Funding. In particular, we consider a variation of the Capital Constrained Quadratic Funding (CQF) mechanism proposed by Buterin, Hitzig and Weyl (2019) where only funds in the matching pool are...

We describe a new mechanism that induces accurate forecasts within an organization while reducing moral hazards and the stigma associated with negative opinions. It is based on the notion of identity escrow, whereby the identity of a forecaster is kept anonymous and only revealed when a number...

The emergence of high frequency trading has resulted in `bursts' of orders arriving at an exchange (nearly) simultaneously, yet most electronic financial exchanges implement the continuous limit order book which requires processing of orders serially. Contrary to an assumption that appears...

We use a game theoretical framework to analyze the intraday behavior of banks with respect to settlement of interbank claims in a real time gross settlement setting. We find that the game played by banks depends upon the intraday credit policy of the central bank and that it encompasses two...

We use a game theoretical framework to analyze the intraday behavior of banks with respect to settlement of interbank claims in a real time gross settlement setting. We find that the game played by banks depends upon the intraday credit policy of the central bank and that it encompasses two...

We analyze bubbles and crashes in a model in which some investors are partially sophisticated. While the expectations of such investors are endogenously determined in equilibrium, these are based on a coarse understanding of the market dynamics. We highlight how such investors may endogenously...

Information aggregation mechanisms are designed explicitly for collecting and aggregating dispersed information. An excellent example of the use of this "wisdom of crowds" is a prediction market. The purpose of our Twitter-based prediction market is to suggest that carefully designed market...

We analyze experimental evidence on whether untrained subjects can predict how trustworthy an individual is. Two players on a TV show play a high stakes prisoner's dilemma with pre-play communication. Our subjects report probabilistic beliefs that each player cooperates, before and after...