This is Part II of a study of the axiomatic and its recent applications to game theory and resource allocation. Part I is a user's guide. Part II discusses alternatives to the axiomatic method and answers criticisms often addressed at the axiomatic method.

In this paper we analyze the connection between Nash bargaining and non-cooperative bargaining, the so-called Nash program, to solve the question of whether outside options should be considered as a the disagreement point.

This paper extends the infinitely repeated tariff lobbying game of Pecorino [8] to allow for imperfect monitoring, and revisits the question of how an industry's ability to maintain a cooperative outcome is affected by the number of firms in the industry. The paper demonstrated that Pecorino [8]...

Calling upon both positive and normative economics, the authors attempt to characterize the issues at stake in the current international negotiations on climatic change.

The paper considers parametric and nonparametric estimation of the distribution function F. Issues of particular interest are the identification properties of this model and, in the nonparametric case, the speed of convergence of the estimator F. The latter depends upon the properties of the...

In this paper we analyze the connection between Nash bargaining and non-cooperative bargaining, the so-called Nash program, to solve the question of whether outside options should be considered as a the disagreement point.

The paper presents in a simple model the possible choices and constraints facing democratic governments when confronting an anti-democratic party challenge that is able to seriously endanger the survival of the democratic system.

This paper characterizes modified evolutionarily stable strategies (MESSES) in Robinstein's alternative-offers, infinite- horizon bargaining game.

This paper studies a population of agents, each of whom can be either an Altruist or an Egoist. Altruists confer benefits on others at a cost to themselves. Altruism is thus a strictly dominated strategy and cannot survive if agents are rational best-responders. We assume that agents choose...

This paper develops an approach to equilibrium selection in game theory based on studying the learning process through which equilibrium is achieved. The differential equations derived from models of interactive learning typically have stationary states that are not isolated. Instead, Nash...